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I would like to begin by thanking each of the reviewers for such careful and provocative readings. I’m 
delighted that the book was well-received and even happier to see the new lines of questioning it 
has provoked—well beyond those which preoccupied me when writing it.  Given the limited space 
available I will not, unfortunately, be able to address all of the questions and concerns raised in the 
reviews. Instead, I would like to use this response section to address a series of questions running 
across all three reviews concerning the relation between time/temporalities, politics and resilience. 
How can we account for the value of resilience?  This is the question I pose in my book.  For its 
advocates, the value of resilience is self-evident.  Resilience promises to provide a degree of security 
within an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world.  For its detractors, the value of resilience is 
wholly negative.  Resilience functions as ideology—promoting a neoliberal agenda in which security 
responsibilities are offloaded from the State onto citizens.  In both cases, resilience is understood to 
be a stable concept whose value can be readily ascertained through a calculation of its utility within 
present circumstances.  However, in practice, resilience appears to be anything but stable.  Multiple, 
often conflicting, meanings of this concept are enacted across academic disciplines and professional 
bodies.  
Rather than approach resilience as a concept whose value could be ascertained once we established 
its proper meaning, I was interested in understanding the historical processes through which the 
meaning(s) and value of resilience emerged over time.  Specifically, I was interested in accounting 
for the conditions which allowed resilience to emerge as the principle value guiding 21st Century 
security policy. For this task I turned to genealogy.  Rather than approaching resilience as a concept 
anchored to a determinate sense, I came to understand resilience as an emergent security value.  As 
a value, resilience harbours multiple, evolving and sometimes contradictory senses.  This diversity is 
often productive: allowing multiple agents to harmonize their disparate activities under the guise of 
achieving a common goal.   In performing a genealogy of resilience, I sought to identify and analyse 
the contingent, and often obscure, political processes through which these diverse meanings, and 
ultimately the value of resilience itself, were historically assembled.  The point wasn’t to advance a 
truer conceptualization of resilience and its value. It was instead to unsettle some of our 
presumptions about the meaning and value of resilience for the sake of opening this concept to 
increasingly critical, experimental and creative engagements to come. 
It is important to stress that this book does not provide an exhaustive account of the history of 
resilience.  For the sake of empirical precision certain decisions were made to restrict my focus.  One 
of these decisions was to focus my investigation on the evolution of a British machinery of 
emergency governance. This meant tracing the institutional history of UK Civil Contingencies to its 
inception as a secret strike-breaking organization in the final years of the First World War.  I looked 
to identify the historical problematics which spurred organizational changes and traced the 
migration of ideas relating to security, protection and resilience into and out of this empirical field.  
Restricting my empirical focus permitted me to describe, with a sufficient degree of detail, how ideas 
related to resilience were taken up, translated, adapted and modified within the particular political 
and social environment of the UK.  But it also undoubtedly meant disregarding other rich lines of 
inquiry in the history of resilience.  Even within the British context, major events including the 1981 
Brixton ‘riots’ (which Alison identifies), the 1984-85 miner’s strikes and the history of policing 
football ‘hooliganism’ were excluded—not because they weren’t integral to the history of UK Civil 
Contingencies, but due to restrictions still in place on public access to the official government 
archives covering these years.  It goes without saying that a detailed analysis of these archives and 
especially those pertaining to Britain’s imperial past would provide substantial insight into the 
historical evolution of UK Civil Contingencies. 
It is in respect to the (underemphasized) importance of history and memory to contemporary logics 
of resilience that genealogy was selected as a method and a memorial selected as the book’s cover 
art. The 7/7 memorial in Hyde Park provides a prominent visual representation of how resilience is 
specifically deployed within the British context.  The memorial consists of 52 individualized sterlae 
(stainless steel pillars) erected in remembrance of each of the individuals who lost their lives in 
terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005. The impermeable steel pillars project a sense of strength 
through loss; that something of who we are persists—or perhaps is even strengthened—through the 
destruction of our vulnerable  material bodies.  The play of temporalities here, as Charlotte adeptly 
notes, is curious.  As a memorial, this installation refers to a discrete past event.  Yet it operates as a 
device for forging a collective memory of how this event should be understood.  In doing so, it seeks 
to project a vision of collective resilience which simultaneously tells us who we are and what we 
should aspire to be.  These complicated temporalities suggest, as Charlotte is correct to point out, 
that resilience cannot be circumscribed to an anticipatory technology of governance without also 
recognizing the significant role that history and memory play in its actualization.  I attempted to 
analyse these relations in the final chapter of the book on Preparedness Exercises.  Recognizing that 
resilience is built through past experience of successfully overcoming crises, the exercise provides a 
controlled space through which individual and collective capacities—and indeed memories—can be 
fostered, tested and refined.  Resilience, in effect, is as much about preparedness and the 
structuring of expectation as it is about achieving a perspective on the past that fosters confidence 
in oneself and those around you.  The future is secured by manufacturing a history of success. 
Like memorialization, the emergency response strategies of UKCC act to mitigate an event’s capacity 
to disrupt the ‘normal’ temporal order. Rather than retrospectively working to impose a meaning 
upon the emergency event supportive of narratives underpinning (state) order (Edkins 2006), 
resilience strategies operate to quickly foreclose the duration, extension and intensity of an 
unfolding event. In my analysis I tried to show how the reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies 
borrowed heavily from concurrent military developments associated with the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA).  The advantage afforded by these reforms, I argued, was ultimately an acceleration of 
the speed of command.  Nick is correct to identify Virilio as a silent interlocutor here. However, as 
much as Virilio helped to orient my analysis I was wary of following him too far down his line of 
critique. As Alison notes, I have been somewhat averse to the claim that the advent of resilience 
marks a militarization of emergency governance.  This is, in fact, a very old critique which has 
resurfaced many times throughout the history of UK Civil Defence and Civil Contingencies.  While not 
unfounded (there has indeed been a heavy military presence in all aspects of civil contingencies 
from its inception in the UK) Alison is correct to identify that the problem with this line of critique is 
that it often leaves what is meant by ‘militarization’ underspecified. This is the same problem we 
encounter with analyses equating resilience with neoliberalism—as if the meaning of neoliberalism 
was any more self-evident than the idea of resilience!  The question for me throughout the book was 
always therefore to be specific as to which concepts, strategies and practices carried over from the 
military into the domain of emergency governance (and vice-versa). 
Registering the influx of military ideas into contemporary civil contingencies operations provides 
valuable insight into the logics and practices of contemporary emergency governance and the wider 
political economy within which these changes operate.  Yet, these changes to both military and civil 
contingencies organization cannot be fully accounted for without the introduction of a third term: 
strategic business management.  This is, in retrospect, an important aspect in the genealogy of 
resilience that I feel was underemphasized in the book.  Of course, military theorists of the RMA 
from Cebrowski to Ronfelt and Arquilla were fascinated by developments in International Business 
organization and strategy, whilst the vast majority of books published in the area of resilience are 
self-help books marketed to entrepreneurs and middle-managers. Recognizing the influence of 
business managerial discourses in shaping resilience thinking may, in turn, have implications for our 
strategies of critique.  Overemphasizing the spectre of war may inadvertently push critique to 
uncover the dark, necropolitical underside of resilience.  Critique once again strains to locate the 
hidden meaning which reveals resilience for what it is. Strategic business management is, by 
contrast, far less spectacular.  While championing the ability of network-enabled communications to 
enhance dynamic capabilities, creativity and self-organization it is clear that by circumscribing these 
terms within the constraints of profit-maximization fundamental limits are placed on the capacity of 
these terms to be fully actualized.  The specific ways in which resilience is currently enacted arguably 
limits the ability of this concept to achieve its promised goals. This raises the question as to whether 
resilience could be interpreted and enacted otherwise.  
In the book’s conclusion I offer some very preliminary ideas on what I term an affirmative critique of 
resilience.  An affirmative critique of resilience would start from the recognition that resilience has 
no inherent meaning or value because it is still very much in the process of becoming.  An affirmative 
critique of resilience would therefore look to experiment with the concept by repeating it 
differently:  by mimicking it; linking it to new objectives and transforming it fundamentally in the 
process. Can we observe resilience-related ideas within projects distinct from, or even opposed to, 
neoliberal programmes of governance? In what ways can resilience be reinterpreted in a way that 
inspires greater communication, creativity and self-organization? What would it mean for us to be 
truly resilient?  Of course, such a line of critique is not without its own dangers.  However dispensing 
with a critique based on binary opposition—in which one must be either for or against resilience—
may open up new avenues for political expression and contestation in the contemporary security 
environment. 
